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Abstract
This paper tries to clear the confusion in the literature about the potential of environmental tax
reforms to yield a double dividend. In opposition to a number of recent papers it is found that
the possibility for a double dividend depends largely on the substitutabllity characteristics of
taxed commodities and not on the uncompensated elasticities. It is found that a double
dividend is possible, if the following conditions are met. First, the initial tax system has to be
inefficient from a non-environmental point of view. Second, it is possible to raise the tax on the
externality creating commodity and in exchange to reduce the tax on a commodity that is a
gross substitute for the externality creating commodity. Third, under the existing distortionary
tax system the commodity whose tax is reduced is relatively difficult to substitute through
other taxed commodities and hence, easier to substitute through the untaxed numeraire.
I am grateful to Gernot Klepper, Ph.D. for valuable suggestions.
21. Introduction
In the discussion of environmental taxation there has been a considerable
confusion about the effects of environmental tax reforms on non-environmental
welfare. Earlier contributions, e.g. Pearce (1991), claim that raising
environmental taxes gives the possibility to the government to reduce the overall
distortion of the existing tax system through a reduction of distorting taxes and
thus, raising environmental and non-environmental welfare. This result gains
importance when designing environmental tax reforms. In the public and also
academic debate on environmental tax reforms it is sometimes postulated that an
environmental tax reform should have two aims: first, it should create
environmental benefits and second, it should reduce preexisting tax distortions.
The second postulate results from the argument that the magnitude of
environmental benefits is largely unknown due to missing markets for
environmental quality (See Goulder (1995)). A tax reform that satisfies both
postulates is said to yield a double dividend. If the tax reform exacerbates
preexisting tax distortions it is not guaranteed that the net welfare effect of the tax
reform is still positive. Therefore, in order to guarantee positive welfare effects,
an environmental tax reform must fulfill the two mentioned postulates. However,
recently a number of papers, Bovenberg and de Mooij (1994), Bovenberg and
van der Ploeg (1994), Goulder (1995), find that the double dividend hypothesis is
subject to serious doubt. These authors find that as long as the uncompensatedelasticity of household labor supply is positive, in a model with a dirty
consumption good causing a negative externality, a tax reform that aims at raising
the tax on the dirty consumption good and reducing the labor income tax ,,will
typically exacerbate, rather than alleviate, preexisting tax distortions",
(Bovenberg, de Mooij (1994), p. 1085.).
However, in a way this result contradicts standard results in modern public
finance. Since Atkinson, Stern (1974) it is known that the uncompensated
elasticity of labor supply determines the marginal social cost of public funds
(MSCF) of a tax rate. When calculating the welfare effects of tax reforms one
compares the MSCF of different tax rates. Incorporated in the MSCF are the
income effects of tax rates. But since all marginal tax changes create the same
income effects all that matters in comparing the welfare effects of different tax
rates are the substitution effects which are described by compensated rather than
uncompensated elasticities.
In this paper it is shown that the results of Bovenberg, de Mooij (1994) and
Bovenberg, van der Ploeg (1994) depend on compensated elasticities and not on
uncompensated elasticities. As a consequence this paper is able to show that the
results of these authors depend largely on assumptions about preferences and thechoice of the numeraire.
1 Further it is shown that an alternative environmental tax
reform in the Bovenberg de Mooij (1994) model is able to yield a double
dividend in which non-environmental welfare and employment increase.
2. The framework
Tax reforms have the feature of changing a vector composed of price vector q
and income vector / , from (q ;I I to Iq ;I J. Using the indirect utility
function W(q;I) it is easy to express the resulting welfare change as
Wiq ;I J - Wyq ;I J. But since utility functions are ordinal and not cardinal,
there is not a unique number that represents this welfare change. For this reason
Hicks (1943) introduced the concepts of compensating variation and equivalent
variation. As shown in Mayshar (1990) both measures are equal when only
marginal variations are considered. Consider the indirect utility function
(2.1) W{q;I - T;z) = max{u(x;z): I - T * qx}
x
where u{x;z) denoted a concave and continuously differentiate utility function, x
denotes the (n + l)*l vector of private commodities, with XQ as the numeraire.
q- p + t denotes consumer price vector, p the producer price vector and / the
1 Orosel, Schob (1995) find that the assumptions on preferences and the choice of the
numeraire also affect the relationship between the Pigou tax and the second best tax rate.
However, these authors do not show the implications of their results for the double dividend
hypothesis.(n x 1) tax vector, x^, p{, q^ and rr- denote the ith element of the vectors x, p, q
and t, respectively. T denotes lump-sum taxes, and z denotes environmental
quality, i. e. — = w~ >0, which is a public good. In order to simplify the
dz
analysis we follow a large part of the literature and assume weak separability in
the utility function between environmental quality z and the vector of private
commodities x, hence — = 0. It is also assumed that environmental quality
dz
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depends on the consumption of the commodity x^, which is an element of the
vector x, in the following way:
(2.2) z = e(xd(q, I - Tj), with e' < 0
Therefore, equation (2.2) describes a consumption externality. Thus, the
government can change the provision of z only via induced changes of dirty
consumption xj. This means that the government has to change taxation in order
to change environmental quality z. The revenue constraint of the government is
(2.3) R-T+ \tiXi{q>I-T).
where R denotes government revenue and t^ commodity tax i. Note that JCQ is
untaxed. Consider a change in the tax rate t^. Assuming a linear transformation
curve, i.e. constant producer price vector/?, differentiating (2.1), while leaving theutility level constant, one can express the marginal costs of raising t^ in terms of
income / in the following way (this expression is derived in the appendix)
(2.4) f_
t
where use of Roy's identity XK = -W IWj has been made and A. = Wr is the
marginal household utility of income. (2.4) gives the marginal compensating
variation in lump-sum income / that is necessary to fully compensate the
household for raising t^. Differentiating (2.3) one gets
dtk i = 1
 dtk
We get the marginal social cost of public funds of t^ as defined in Schob (1995)
by dividing (2.4) through the marginal government revenue R^
dlldtu XK l u7





where MCF^ denotes the private marginal cost of public funds of t^ as defined
commonly in modern public finance, e. g. Mayshar (1990), and MEI^ denotes the
marginal environmental impact of t^. MSCF^ measures the welfare costs of a tax
increase per unit of additional government revenue raised by the marginal
increase in t^. Expressing the welfare costs per unit of additional governmentrevenue, allows the comparison of welfare costs of different tax rates. If MSCFk
is negative, raising tk yields a welfare gain, since lump sum income could be
taken away from the household without changing its pretax utility level.
The measure MCFk gives the welfare costs that result from a change in
consumption of commodity k. MCFk denotes therefore the marginal private
welfare costs of tk.
The measure MElk gives the marginal welfare costs that are associated with a
change in environmental quality. MEIk denotes therefore environmental benefits
note that this benefit is negative if —— > 0, i.e. commodity k and d are gross
dtk
substitutes. MEIk has to be subtracted from MCFk since a positive
environmental benefit reduces the marginal welfare costs of raising tk. This
definition of MSCF allows us to separate the environmental benefits and the
private benefits of a tax reform. Closely related to MSCF is the marginal social
excess burden MSEB. The MSEB wants to compensate the household only over
the additional revenue that the government raises by a tax change. Differentiating
(2.1) while leaving the utility level constant gives
(2.6)Note that MSEB^ =(MSCFfc -l)^- With this framework one can analyze the
welfare costs of environmental tax reforms.
3. Environmental tax reform and the double dividend
In this section environmental tax reforms are considered in which the government
raises an environmental tax td on the externality creating dirty consumption good
xd and in exchange adjusts another tax tc, such that the tax revenue R remains
constant. Throughout the analysis it is assumed that the marginal revenue of a tax
is always positive, which is the normal case. The marginal social excess burden
that results when in exchange for raising an environmental tax td a distortionary
tax tr is reduced, is derived from
j
(3.7) Wqd dtd + Wqc dtc + Wj (Rddtd + Rcdtc +dl)+Wzdz = 0
Note that revenue neutrality means Rddtd + Rcdtc =0. Equation (3.7) can be
rearranged to give
(3 8)
dtd " ^Rc X {dtd dtcRc
This expression can be rewritten as








 JEquation (3.9) says that the described environmental tax reform will yield a
welfare gain if the expression on the right hand side is negative, or in other words
MSCFd < MSCFC
In the literature it is usually stated that there is uncertainty about the
environmental benefits. An en\ ironmental tax reform yields environmental
benefits as long as
MEIC < MEId




From (3.10) it can be seen that environmental benefits are always be positive, if
dxd
dtc
> 0. As pointed out by Schob (1995), a sufficient condition for achieving
environmental benefits is that an environmental tax reform reduces only taxes on
commodities that are gross substitutes for the dirty commodity. This means that
as long as the commodities c and d are gross substitutes an environmental tax
reform will yield an environmental benefit.
Under the assumption that an environmental tax reform reduces taxes on
commodities that are gross substitutes for the dirty consumption good, the
environmental benefits are guaranteed to be positive. There is uncertainty about
10the magnitude of the environmental benefit, such that it is not known if the
environmental benefits outweigh possible decreases in non-environmental
welfare. The uncertainty stems from the term
1 u7
Rk \ ' Btk
u7 Since there is no market for environmental quality, — cannot be observed. Also
A.
e' is not known in a lot of cases due to informational lacks. All that is known
u7 with certainty about — and e are the signs.
A,
Under the assumption that environmental tax reforms reduce taxes on
commodities that are gross substitutes for the dirty consumption good a necessary
and sufficient condition for a double dividend is
(3.11) MCFd<MCFc
That is the marginal cost of public funds should be higher for the tax rate that is
about to be reduced then the specified environmental tax reform will yield a
double dividend. Substituting the demand functions into (3.11) gives after some
manipulations
(3.12) xdxc\ I ±zci - I f Etf I
liwhere use of the symmetry of the Slutzky matrix has been made, e •• denotes the
compensated demand elasticity of commodity j with respect to commodity price /.
If expression (3.12) is negative and commodity c is a gross substitute for the dirty
commodity d then an environmental tax reform that raises the environmental tax
tj and reduces the tax tc will yield a double dividend. For a value added tax with
t} = /?J-XJ and q- = (l + *i)pi expression (3.12) gives the following condition for a







Expression (3.13) shows that the double dividend depends on initial tax rates and
on compensated demand elasticities. In order to yield a double dividend the
government has to reduce taxes on commodities c that are relatively more
difficult to substitute through other taxed commodities. Commodity d should be












t (3.13) that the commodity whose tax is reduced
X;
should in average, where the weights are —-—, be a better Hicksian substitute
1
for the numeraire relative to the dirty commodity.
12im Instirufs fur Welfrwirischaft
4. An important special case: The Bovenberg, de Mooy model
An important special case of the result obtained above is described in the
contributions of Bovenberg, de Mooij (1994b) and Bovenberg, van der Ploeg
(1994).
2 To these two contributions we refer to as the Bovenberg, de Mooij
model. In these papers the model consists in a linear production technology that
employs only labor L and produces a clean and a dirty consumption good denoted
with C and D, respectively. (3 denotes labor productivity. With C as the
numeraire, whose price is qg = 1 and hence qp = 1 +tp. Utility is weakly
separable in environmental quality z and the private goods leisure V = 1 - L, dirty
and clean consumption, D and C. Consumption D and C is weakly separable from
leisure V. The utility function is therefore u = u[z;M(v;Q(C;D))), where Af(-) and
Q(-) are the corresponding subutility functions which are assumed to be








C + {l + tD)D = (l-tL)wL
In this section a simplified version of these models is presented that nevertheless captures










In order to derive a welfare measure for a taxreform we totally differentiate the
utility function
= 0 = uydV uzdz
From the necessary conditions of a household optimum it is known that the
marginal utility of a commodity equals the price times the Lagrange multiplier A..
Substituting the necessary conditions characterizing household behavior into the
total differential of the utility function we get
du = 0 = -X(l - tL )wdL + XdC + X(1 + tD)dD + uzdz
Differentiating the household budget constraint delivers
dC + (l + tD)dD -(l-tL)wdL = dl - dtDD - dtLwL
where dl describes the additional lump-sum household income that is needed to
restore the household to the indifference curve that his utility was on before the
14tax change. From the last two equations and total differentiation of the
government budget constraint with dG - 0 one can derive
(4.14) 1 I 3 I
{l-tL)wLX (l-tL)wL(l + tD) (\-tL)
where 7 = dl/(l-tL)wL. (4.14) gives additional lump-sum household income
that is needed to restore the household to the indifference curve that his utility
was on before the tax change. The first term measures the environmental benefit
of an environmental tax reform The last two terms measure the non-
environmental benefit. If the first term and the sum of the last two terms is
negative, there is a double dividend since environmental and private welfare are
increasing. In the next section the welfare effects of an environmental tax reform
are analyzed.
4.1. Environmental tax reform in the Bovenberg, de Mooy model
In this section the government changes increases the environmental tax tp and
adjusts the tax on labor income t^ such that government revenue remains
constant. In order to analyze the welfare effects of such a tax reform the model in
table 1 is log linearized. In the appendix the following log-linearized equations
are derived:










D = C -OQ7D







Y = acC + aDD
Table 2
dx
A tilde denotes a relative change, i. e. x = — For the tax rates we have
Tj = —-— and tn = —^—. The variable y denotes the elasticity of
\-tL 1 + tD
environmental quality with respect to dirty consumption. 0 denotes the
uncompensated elasticity of labor supply, QQ =C/WL, dp =D/wL, OQ denotes
the elasticity of substitution between C and D, and (f)^ = (1 + tj))D/(l - ti)wL.











The determinant \Det\ is negative due to stability considerations.
3 Hence, for a
positive elasticity of labor supply, employment decreases as a consequence of the
environmental tax reform, specified above. In order to determine the sign of
(4.17) a closer look at the determinant is needed. The determinant is:
(4.18) \Det\ = ^f-Q + (ac + ^) '
LV"J
 v
 x < 0
From (4.18) it is clear that the demand for dirty consumption will decrease as a
consequence of an increase in tp. A look at equation (4.14) that measures the
welfare change and z = yD tells us that the environmental tax reform will lead to
an increase in environmental welfare, but a decrease in non-environmental
welfare. Hence, there is no double dividend in the Bovenberg, de Mooij model.
3 A sufficient condition for local stability is that the matrix in (4.15) is negative definite. The
trace is clearly negative. Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for the negative
definiteness of the matrix is that the determinant is also negative. Instead of analyzing the
stability properties of the model, one can also argue that decreasing government
expenditure and keeping the dirt tax constant should enable the government to decrease the
labor tax. This also requires a negative determinant. In this model the stability postulate is
equivalent to postulating that a decrease in government spending with keeping td constant
should result in a smaller tL.
17This result is valid as long as the initial tax tD is positive and the uncompensated
elasticity of labor supply is positive.
The result of the Bovenberg, de Mooij model suggests that uncompensated
elasticities play an important role in the evaluation of an environmental tax
reform. In order to show that this reasoning is wrong we derive the compensated
elasticities of the Bovenberg, de Mooij model. The compensated demand
elasticities can be expressed as a function of the elasticities of substitution cry



















where o^ denotes the elasticity of substitution between labor and private





Equation (4.19) indicates the reason for the failure for the double dividend
hypothesis. The price of the dirty consumption good and the price of leisure
increases through the tax changes. In order to yield a double dividend, labor has
to be the better Hicksian substitute for the clean good, compared to the dirty
good. With the specified utility function from above, the dirty consumption good
is the better Hicksian substitute for the clean consumption good. Hence, in the
Bovenberg, de Mooij model a double dividend cannot be achieved, if in exchange
for raising the environmental tax, the labor tax is reduced.
The' reason for the failure of the double dividend hypothesis in this model is
that the government is unable to reduce the labor tax sufficiently, if it has to
maintain an unchanged revenue. This is because raising the environmental tax will
cause substitution away from the dirty consumption good to the untaxed clean
consumption good. Thus the decrease in demand for dirty consumption will not
only improve environmental quality, but also erode the tax base of the
government. This effect, that Bovenberg, de Mooij (1994) call the tax base
erosion effect, is responsible for the inability of the government to reduce the
labor tax sufficiently.
194.2. An alternative environmental tax reform in the Bovenberg, de Mooy
model
The reason for the failure of the double dividend hypothesis in the Bovenberg, de
Mooij model, is the assumption that dirty and clean consumption are closer
Hicksian substitutes than labor and clean consumption. To strengthen this point,
let us consider a simple modification of the environmental tax reform in the
Bovenberg, de Mooij model. Instead of reducing the tax on labor income the tax
on the clean consumption good is reduced, while labor becomes the untaxed
commodity. This simple modification will give some insights into the mechanisms
at work.
The welfare measure for the tax reform is now:
(4.20) = -tcacC-tDaDD- XwL
•dz














Y = acC + aDD
z =yD
Table 4









The determinant, which again has to be negative, is:
\Det\ = (1 - tc)ac[{QtD - l)aD + (6rc - l)ac] (4.22)
One can derive:
-oacaD[tD -tc]<0
(4.23) C -1 oaD(l-tDe)
(4.24) ^- =






The condition for the double dividend is
(4.25) tc>tD
One can show that (4.25) is also the condition for increasing employment.
This result emphasizes two aspects: First, the welfare costs of an
environmental tax reform can be influenced substantially by the initial tax rates,
as Bovenberg, de Mooij (1994) have noticed. Second, compared to the original
Bovenberg, de Mooij analysis the modified analysis shows that the welfare costs
of an environmental tax reform can be influenced by the choice of tax rates to be
reduced.
If the tax system is initially efficient from a non-environmental point of view, i.
e. tc =tD, the non-environmental welfare costs of the environmental tax reform
are zero. This result shows that non-environmental welfare costs depend largely
on how far the initial tax system is away from non-environmental efficiency.
From standard results of optimal taxation it is known, however, that non-
environmental efficiency depends on the compensated demand elasticities. The
compensated demand elasticities are shown in table 3. Inserting the relevant
compensated demand elasticities into (3.12) gives
(4.26) DC(tD-tc)aMV
22Expression (4.26) has to be negative in order to yield a double dividend.
^>
Expression (4.25) confirms the result expressed in (4.26).
5. Conclusions
The above analysis underlines that an environmental tax reform yields a double
dividend if the tax on a commodity is reduced that is a better substitute for the
numeraire than the dirty good and the numeraire. In this case the tax base erosion
effect can be limited such that the government is able to sufficiently reduce the
tax on the other good, so a double dividend is possible. In this case there will be
still substitution away from the dirty good. But at the same time there will be
substitution from the dirty good to the good whose tax is reduced. This limits and
possibly erases the tax base erosion effect. Definitely, one cannot say that
environmental taxes typically exacerbate, rather than alleviate, preexisting tax
distortions" when revenues are used to cut preexisting distortionary taxes. It all
depends on which tax rates are cut. The above analysis shows that there will be a
double dividend if the tax system approaches to the tax system that is efficient
from a non-environmental point of view and the commodities with reduced taxes
are gross substitutes to the dirty goods.
In general there will be a double dividend if the following conditions are met.
First, the initial tax system has to be inefficient also from a non-environmental
23point of view.
4 Second, it is possible to raise the tax on the externality creating
commodity and in exchange to reduce the tax on a commodity that is a gross
substitute for the externality creating commodity. Third, under the existing
distortionary tax system the commodity whose tax is reduced is relatively difficult
to substitute through other taxed commodities and hence easier to substitute
through the untaxed numeraire. If the last two conditions are met, the tax base
erosion effect that results from raising the tax on the externality creating
commodity will be eliminated such that the government is able to sufficiently
reduce another distorting tax.
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0 = Wqk dtk + Wjdl + Wzdz
Rearranging gives
dtk
Since — = xk, — = -^- and = e'——, substitution yields (2.4). Dividing
Wj Wj X dtk dtk
dR
(2.4) through = Rk, delivers MSCFk in equation (2.5). For readers familiar
dtk
with optimal taxation, the intuition of the measure MSCF can be seen from the
optimal taxation problem:
25maxW(q;I - T;z) subject to R = T + Y
The first order condition for tk can be written as
where \i is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the government's revenue
constraint. Dividing through Wj = X and rearranging gives
e
R/c Rk X dtk X
In the optimum the MSCF is equal for all taxes. When analyzing tax reforms,
where the reform starts from an arbitrary equilibrium, the MSCF are different, in
general.
Derivation of table 2
~ C ~ D ~ C
From Y = C + D + G one obtains with dG = 0, Y = — C + — D, with ac = — and
Y y
 L Y
aj) = —. The loglinearized government budget constraint, loglinearized
production function, and the log linearized equilibrium condition for w are
obtained in the same way.
From the necessary conditions characterizing household behavior one can obtain
26Qc
Differentiating this condition and considering the definition of the elasticity of
substitution one gets
D = C -OQTD
Due to the weak separabilty assumption of the utility function the household
decision between consumption of commodities and consumption of leisure can be
characterized through the following maximization problem
max Mil - L, Q) subject to poQ = (l -1 r )wL
V;Q *
where PQ is the optimal price index defined as pn ——• This
Q





 V>Q[ PQ J
From this follows the labor supply function L =L\ —— . Total
I PQ )






 +$D*D)- Note that in the price index PQ the quantities remain
27constant, since they refer to the initial equilibrium and that only the tax rates
change. Note also §D = ——.
PQQ
Derivation of table 3
Weak separability of the utility function implies that the optimal choice of V, C, D
can be described by the indirect utility functions
WQ(PC;(1 + tD);pQQ) = max{Q(C;D):PcC + {l + tD)D
- tL)frpQ)max{M(V;Q):(\ - tL)$V + pQQ
The duals to these problems are the following minimum expenditure functions
E
Q{PC;O- + tD);Q) = min{PcC + (l + tD)D:Q -Q(C;D)}
E
M{pQ;{\ - tL)$;M) = min{(\ - tL)$V + pQQ:M = M{V;Q)}
The functions M( •) and Q{ •) are assumed to be homothetic. This implies that the
minimum expenditure functions can be written as
Al PQQ = EQ{PC;(1 + tD);Q) = e%c;{\ + tD))Q
A2 (1 - «L)P - E
M{PQ;{1 - rL)p\-M) - e
M(pQ;{l - tL)$)M





where 8jy is the compensated elasticity of demand from commodity / with respect
to commodity j. The compensated demand function for commodity i is described
through E[.
Log linearizing the compensated demand function C = ep Q(pc;(l +t£)))Q
gives
A3 C-Q = (7)
Note that a minimum expenditure function E is linearly homogenous in prices.
One can derive similar to A3
A4 D-Q = oQ(l- $D)(pc - h)
Similarly, one can derive
A5 Q"(T)
29A6 v = oM(l-V)(pQ+7L)
Note that A/ = 0.













A8 L = ~oM^(l - <J>D),PC - oM%rD - oMVtL
The terms connected to the price changes in A7 and A8 give the compensated
demand elasticities from table 3.
30